Malware constitutes a major global risk affecting millions of users each year. Standard algorithms in detection systems perform insufficiently when dealing with malware passed through obfuscation tools. We illustrate this studying in detail an open source metamorphic software, making use of a hybrid framework to obtain the relevant features from binaries. We then provide an improved alternative solution based on adversarial risk analysis which we illustrate describe with an example.
INTRODUCTION
The digital era is bringing along new global threats among which cybersecurity related ones emerge as truly worrisome, see for example the evolution of the Global Risks Map from the World Economic Forum (2017, 2018, 2019) . Indeed, the operation of critical cyber infrastructures relies on components which could be cyber attacked, both incidentally and intentionally, suffering major performance degradation, Rao et al. (2016) . A key concern is malware (an acronym for malicious software) which, according to ENISA (2019) , is among the top threats in the cybersecurity landscape. Indeed, malware (Radai, 1992) in its many forms, including trojans, worms, viruses, spyware or adware, affect millions of hosts each year, Malwarebytes (2018) .
Moreover, as reflected in Couce et al. (2019) , the negative impacts of such threats may include not only purely financial costs, but also deaths and injuries when dealing with cyber-physical systems, going through stolen personal identifiable information or business secrets in enterprise systems.
Detection systems are important components in cybersecurity risk management frameworks, see Barrett (2018) . Anti-malware tools based on scanning file signatures used to recognise most malware until relatively recently. However, these tools are much less effective nowadays due to the continuous changes introduced in such software, as attackers learn how ICT systems owners advance in protection measures. Elingiusti et al. (2018) and Ye et al. (2017) provide surveys of current methodologies for malware detection, usually classified in three categories: static, dynamic and hybrid. Static analysis extract relevant binary information from the software without running it; dynamic methods are carried out in separate isolated environments, like sandboxes, to extract relevant information from the running software; hybrid methods combine both approaches, typically allowing us to gain better information and understanding of the behaviour of the incumbent binary file. Examples include Santos et al. (2009) , who introduce a static analysis with Portable Executable (PE) files and describe that malware detection works reasonably well based on operational codes (OpCodes); Anderson et al. (2012) who combine both approaches through kernel analysis; and Van Nhuong et al. (2014) who use semantic sets and N-gram bytes with a Naive Bayes (NB) classifier jointly with an API function-based signature. Our benchmark will be O' Kane et al. (2016) as their binary dataset was available and we could use it for comparison. They use OpCode density histograms extracted during run time execution and classify with Support Vector Machines (SVM).
A prominent attacking strategy through malware is obfuscation which designates a group of procedures that make a malware binary more difficult to be detected through anti-malware tools, as reflected in the camouflage malware progression presented in Figure 1 . The term stealth is used when a binary hides its code to other programs; this method was not considered effective as antimalware tools were able to find the benign parts of the code and detect the remaining malware portion. The next obfuscation advance was based on encryption, so that the code included a loop that encrypts its body. Then, attackers tried oligomorphic malware which includes loops using predefined forms for each malware copy; however, once antimalware tools were redesigned to search for all predefined loop combinations, malware became vulnerable again.
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Metamorphic 1998 / now Figure 1 : The malware camouflage progression, Rad et al. (2012) Currently, obfuscation techniques have become very sophisticated and are based on two principles: poly and metamorphism, You and Yim (2010) . Polymorphic methods encrypt the malware body, changing its form for each malware copy. Metamorphic methods use advanced obfuscation based on employing mutation engines which modify the whole binary: consequently, each new malware clone has a different code sequence, size, structure or syntactic properties making highly difficult for anti-malware tools to detect it.
A few approaches have been used to detect obfuscation attacks. Lakhotia et al. (2005) obtain stack operations to detect obfuscated functions, but found that the stack was easy to corrupt. Rolles (2009) proposes a circumvention method to break a virtualisation obfuscator converting the code to byte code language; after conversion, he applies reverse engineering techniques. Kakisim et al. (2018) provide several algorithms to detect metamorphic malware based on hidden Markov models, K-means clustering, artificial neural networks, Bayesian networks and decision trees. Kaushal et al. (2012) count the API call frequency to detect metamorphic malware which performs useless code insertion, register usage exchange, code reordering through jump instructions or equivalent instruction replacement.
In this work, we propose a methodology to protect from obfuscation attacks based on Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA), Banks et al. (2015) . Section 2 presents a framework for malware detection based on hybrid analysis which provides our initial benchmark. Section 3 illustrates the problems entailed by metamorphic malware rendering standard methods less effective. We then detail our ARA model to detect obfuscation attacks over the benchmark performed. We finally provide examples and conclude with a discussion.
A FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT FROM MALWARE USING A HYBRID APPROACH
The approach initially proposed to detect malware uses a combination of static and dynamic methods and comprises five stages, Figure 2 : preprocessing, feature extraction, feature management, training and operation. It will serve as benchmark for our later developments. 
Preprocessing
We start with a set of binary samples to train a classifier. Each binary is labelled as malware (M) or benign (B). If some of the binaries available are not labelled, we assess their label through a tool called VirusTotal (VT), Chronicle (2018). VT uses 70 online anti-malware systems; we consider a binary as malware when at least 50% of them indicate so.
Feature extraction
Feature extraction combines the procurement of static features directly from the binary and dynamic features when executed in a controlled environment. For our hybrid approach, we use the static Assembly Language File (ASM) features considered by Chadwick (2017) as well as the Hexadecimal dump (Hex dump) and the Portable Executable File Header (PE Header) static features determined by Ahuja (2017) , who claim to have achieved good results in malware detection.
Static features
They are divided into three categories depending on the method employed to extract them:
• ASM. We convert the binaries into assembled files through objdump, GNU Binutils (2019). Then, we extract its sections, registers, OpCodes, API calls and keywords.
• Hex dump. We transform the binaries into the hexadecimal format through hexdump, FreeBSD (2019).
We then obtain the file size, the mean, median, maximum and minimum of the binary entropy, along with the entropy of the whole binary and the entropy variance and range.
• PE Header, Wang et al. (2009) . The standard file format allows us to extract features from the binaries such as the size of the code and the number of sections, symbols and imports. 
Dynamic features
Dynamic features are generated based on the run time behaviour of the binaries executed within a Virtual Machine. To perform such analysis we use the Cuckoo Sandbox (2018) environment, which generates a report from the behaviour obtained over a fixed period of time. We use a two minutes default configuration.
We obtain the reports from all the binaries selecting twelve features which we consider relevant for malware detection including the number of mutex (used to coordinate program processes when the program has to perform several tasks simultaneously), the number of file operations such as the files read or deleted (used by some malware to steal or remove information to cause fraud or damage), the register operations and the dll libraries loaded.
Feature management
In this phase, we perform feature management. We select the most suitable features for the incumbent classifier in the problem at hand and study the data types which may be transformed into categorical, discrete or continuous, looking for those providing best results. This may entail repeated iterations through this step and 2.4. We then randomly split the dataset into train and test subsets, according to a division ratio e.g. of 0.20: 80% of the set is used to train and the remaining 20% for testing purposes.
Training
At this stage, we must choose the classification algorithms to be used for malware detection. As the quantity of data in the digital era is enormous, for instance, it is typical that threat intelligent systems have to process hundreds of thousands of binaries per day to determine whether they are malware or not, we need classifiers that obtain results in a reasonable time, see Ye et al. (2017) for a survey.
In this paper, we consider as benchmark a NB classifier, (Lewis, 1998) . This classifier has been used for malware detection by Sahay and Chaudhari (2019) , among many other authors. NB requires short computational time for training compared with others and also, it is highly scalable, see Ashari et al. (2013) .
We shall train the NB classifier based on maximising expected utility. A typical utility in this context is the 0 − 1 utility (1 if it classifies correctly; 0, otherwise), implicitly leading to standard classification criteria based on detection accuracy (DA), and the false positive (FPR) and false negative (FNR) rates. However, in a more risk analytic fashion, we could consider other utility functions, see our discussion in Section 5.2.
Operation
Once we have properly chosen the features and trained our classifier, we set up the framework into operation.
When we receive a new binary, we extract its features and process them through the classifier to decide whether it corresponds to benign software or to malware. The operational criteria used, as in standard risk analysis Bedford et al. (2001) , is based on maximising expected utility through
where c(x) is the class (malware, benign) which maximises expected utility, y C is the class to be predicted for the binary, u C is the utility function used by the organisation and p(y|x) is the probability of the binary belonging to class y given the features x.
Benchmark experiments
The experiments 1 reported here were performed in a distributed system with 25 nodes (16 cores, each at 2.60GHz). The hybrid framework has been implemented in Python 3.6.7 with packages such as sklearn, numpy, pandas and joblib, and it has been tested with malware datasets from VxHeaven (2013) 
THE IMPACT OF OBFUSCATED MALWARE
As we have seen, we may achieve reasonably good detection results through the proposed hybrid approach, accomplishing better performance than e.g As a consequence, during the obfuscation process, the number of xor OpCodes will decrease, whereas that of sub OpCodes would increase. Note that due to these modifications other features could be affected indirectly. To observe such changes, we obfuscated 3000 binaries counting the instances in which each feature was modified through obfuscation. Figure 4 shows the 20 features most modified, ranked according to the number of times they were modified. To further understand the obfuscation process, we applied it 100 times to a specific binary to check whether there were features that might stop changing after a certain number of obfuscations. Figure 5a represents the evolution of the modification percentage of the nop, push, pop and mov features after 14 obfuscations,
whereas Figure 5b illustrates that of the xor, sub, test and or features after 100 obfuscations. We notice that the first features practically stop changing after 13 obfuscations. However, the features reflected in Figure 5b keep on varying their values throughout the repeated application of the obfuscator.
To assess the impact of obfuscation on the detection process, we trained a NB classifier with nonobfuscated VT (2018) malware mixed with benign binaries (50% malware, 50% benign) as in in Section 2.6. Then, we predicted through a test set formed by metame obfuscated VT malware mixed with benign binaries, with results in Figure 6 Given this performance degradation, we explored whether certain feature management operations may improve results somehow robustifying algorithms. For that, as described in Section 2.3, we transformed the data into different types trying a Bernoulli NB with binary features (expressed with 1 when the feature is present and 0 when it is absent); a Multinomial NB with discrete features (representing the feature 8 frequency in the binaries), Singh et al. (2019) ; and a Gaussian NB with continuous features (assuming they are distributed according to a normal distribution), Yilmaz et al. (2019) , to determine the classifier providing better results. As shown in Figure 7 , the Bernoulli NB classifier performs better because of its underlying modelling assumptions. After such feature transformation, we also checked for the minimum number of features needed to reach a reasonable accuracy. This is important so as to reduce computation times in presence of very large amounts of binaries. We performed experiments adding features one by one to the classifier to observe the accuracy evaluation, Figure 8 , based on the ranking in Figure 4 (extended to the 1068 features). We observe that with about 120 features, NB achieves around 80% accuracy and with around 220 features, it reaches around 85%.
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We have discussed how a classifier which operates under the standard maximum expected utility risk analytic criteria in (1) may see its performance deteriorated if we do not pay attention to the presence of attackers ready to modify the features of a malware. Thus, we need to take into account the presence of such adversaries when making the detection decisions. The model that we shall propose to detect obfuscation attacks will adapt the adversarial risk analysis approach in Naveiro et al. (2019) . We sketch the common elements with that framework, emphasising the differences proposed to detect malware.
We consider a classifier (C, she="Cleo") aiming at maximising her expected utility when classifying binaries between benign (y=B) and malware (y=M). An adversary (A, he="Alan") is willing to obfuscate binaries maximising his expected utility: he modifies the features x in malware binaries to x = o(x) through obfuscation to outguess the classifier. We designate such obfuscation as o x→x . The problem faced by both agents is represented in Figure 9 through a bi-agent influence diagram, Banks et al. (2015) . We consider that the attacker is only interested in obfuscating malware, considering that he makes attacks only in the operational phase. Thus, we assume that training is undertaken with non-obfuscated malware.
Therefore, the classifier may estimate the distribution (p C (y)) of malware and benign software, as well as the distribution (p C (x|y)) of the features given the software type, in our case through NB during the training phase.
Classifier's problem
She deals with the problem as a game from a Bayesian perspective, Kadane and Larkey (1982) , taking into account that Alan's obfuscation decision is random to her. For her analysis, the classifier needs: For a given binary characterised by its features x, we assume we may consider a set of reasonable obfuscations O(x). As a consequence, for a given binary received with features x , we may consider the corresponding X of features x that lead to x , when the optimal binary is obfuscated. Specifically, given a binary x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) with features x i ∈ {0, 1} we designate by I(x) the set of indices with x i = 0.
Then, the set of possible attacks over the binaries O(x) = {O H : H ⊂ I(x)} where O H represents that the features whose index j ∈ H are converted into a 1. Similarly, given a binary x , let J(x ) be the set of indices with x i = 1. Then, the set of originating binaries is X = {x K : J(x )}, where x K is such that x i = 0 if i ∈ K, and x i = x i , otherwise. However, to constraint the size of these sets so as to mitigate computational bottlenecks, we introduce a maximum number of originating binaries, randomly sampled, and a maximum number of attacks, again randomly sampled.
Then, given x , Cleo aims at finding the class c(x ) maximising her expected utility, which based on the developments in Naveiro et al. (2019) , can be computed (rather than through (1) which would be adversary unaware) through
where p C (o x→x |x, M ) models the probability, according to her, that the attacker adopts the obfuscation o x→x when the malware has original features x.
Note that all of the required ingredients in (2) are standard risk analytic assessments, except for p C (o x→x |x, M ) due to its strategic component. We facilitate its estimation considering next the problem faced by the Attacker.
Attacker's problem
To solve his decision making model we need, in principle: p A (x |o, x), which assess his beliefs about the obfuscation attacks performed to x; u A (y C , y, o), describing his preferences when the classifier predicts the label to be y C , the actual label is y and the attack is o; and, p A (c(x )|x ), which expresses his thoughts about the classifier's prediction when she observes the features x of the (obfuscated) binary. Let p = p A (c(o(x)) = M |x ) be the probability that the attacker concedes to Cleo saying that the binary is malware, when she observes x . Since he will have uncertainty about it, we denote its density by f A (p|o(x)), and designate its expectation p A o(x) . Then, he seeks to maximise his expected utility through
However, she does not know his problem ingredients p A o(x) , u A . Suppose that we model her uncertainty about them through a random expectation P A o(x) and random utilities U A (y C , y, o). Then, the random optimal obfuscation, when the malware features are x, will be
and we would make p C (o x→x |x, M ) = P r(A * (x, M ) = o x→x ). Typically, we would approximate the attack probability p C (o x→x |x, M ) through Monte Carlo. We focus before on assessing the elements U A and P A o (x).
In relation with U A , recall first that, without loss of generality, we may associate utility 0 with the worst consequence and utility 1 with the best one, having the other consequences intermediate utilities, e.g. French and Insua (2000) . In this problem, the best consequence for the attacker is that the classifier accepts a malware as benign (he then has opportunities to pursue his business), whereas his worst consequence holds when she stops a malware as such (he has wasted effort in a lost opportunity). The consequences related with benign binaries are in between (and are actually irrelevant for the Attacker's risk analysis). Therefore, we may actually say that U A (M, M, o) ∼ δ 0 and U A (B, M, o) ∼ δ 1 , the degenerate distributions at 0 and 1, respectively. Then, Alan's random optimal attack would be
As far as P A o(x) is concerned, its assessment could be based on an estimate r of P r C (c(x ) = M |x ). As a probability, r ranges in [0, 1] and we could make P A o(x) ∼ βe(δ 1 , δ 2 ), with mean δ 1 /(δ 1 + δ 2 ) = r and variance (δ 1 δ 2 )/[(δ 1 + δ 2 ) 2 (δ 1 + δ 2 + 1)] = var as perceived, from which we obtain the parameters δ 1 and δ 2 . In order to estimate r, given a binary with features x , we consider all reasonable attacks leading to it. Let p 1 be the malware probability estimates of these attacks; p 2 , the benign probability estimates of these attacks. Then, we estimate r through r = p 1 /(p 1 + p 2 ). Note that such probability estimates are available from the training stage of the classifier.
We then use simulation with L samples from the random probabilities, and find O * l (x, M ) = arg max o 1 − P A,l o(x) , l = 1, .., L estimating the required probability through
(3)
An updated framework
The hybrid framework for malware detection proposed in Section 2 included an operational phase in which detection was based on standard risk analytic computations as in (1). However, this is prone to be fooled by intelligent adversaries and we need to update the framework replacing it by the adversarial risk analytic version (2) which takes into account that the attacker might obfuscate the malware. At this point, we would stress also the need to replace the standard 0 − 1 utility model used in classification by utilities better reflecting the severity of malware impact as illustrated in Section 5.2.
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We test the proposed approach using the developments in Sections 3 and 4. The dataset is divided into training and test sets with a 0.20 division ratio. We first train a Bernoulli NB with benign and non-obfuscated malware data. We perform 10 groups of 100 experiments averaging the results. We report the best results achieved based on the following parameters: Monte Carlo size L = 700 in (3); variance var = 0.25 for the βe(δ 1 , δ 2 ) distribution; 300 original binaries x generated leading to x j and 20 attacks o(x) leading to x . To reach such settings, we performed an large quantity of experiments exploring ranges for the parameters; for instance, we tried the values L ∈ {100, 200, . . . , 1000} in combination with the other parameters, achieving best results with L = 700.
0 − 1 Utility
In the first set of experiments, we use the standard 0 − 1 utility (1 if binary is correctly classified and 0, otherwise) as presented in Table III , which leads to the standard DA classification criteria. Figure 10 represents the performance comparison of the proposed approach, which we designate Adversarial Risk Analysis for Obfuscation Attacks (AROA), with that of NB.
Actual y = M y = B
Predic. y C = M 1 0 Observe that AROA obtains higher accuracy than the best version of NB.
A non-standard utility function
We test now our AROA approach with other utilities, penalising more false negatives (a malware binary classified as benign), with, e.g., −5, than false positives (when a benign binary is classified as malware), as we consider those much more harmful. This utility function is reflected in Table IV and accuracy results presented in Figure 11 . In this case, we again observe that AROA performs better than NB attaining bigger accuracy. More importantly, we have computed the associated expected utilities based on Table IV . For this we used 4 groups of 10 experiments whose results are shown in Figure 12 which portray the larger expected utilities obtained with AROA vs a standard (utility sensitive) NB approach. Again we observe that AROA clearly outperforms NB, perhaps even more markedly, in terms of attained utility. Similar results have been attained with other utility functions.
DISCUSSION
Malware entails major cybersecurity risks as attackers learn to use advanced obfuscation techniques to degrade the detection capacities of standard algorithms. We showcased the potential degradation with a metamorphic tool used by attackers to obfuscate malware. Due to these inefficiencies, we have proposed a novel approach based on adversarial risk analysis combined with a hybrid framework which extracts static and dynamic features from binaries. We analysed it observing which features are relevant during the obfuscation process and how their entailed data transformations affect NB performance. Our alternative approach based on adversarial risk analytic computations improve performance suggesting potential in applications, even more taking into account its operational speed.
There are many ways to continue this work. First, we have exemplified the approach with NB classifiers; however many other algorithms have been used in this area as reviewed in the Introduction and they could replace NB in our development. We have considered a two-class problem (benign, malware) but there are other cybersecurity risk analysis problems which are multiclass (as with crime server classification) and we could extend the framework to such context. We have also considered attacks in the operational phase, but it could be the case that attacks take place in the training phase, and there is a need for further developments in this area as well.
